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CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW AND
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
NORMAN P. GOLDMAN*
Canada has always offered enterprising foreign companies new
horizons for virtually unlimited growth. The untapped potential of
Canadian markets has enticed a steady stream of investment by
American firms.' Difficulty often arises, however, because American
investors fail to realize that, in spite of its geographical proximity,
Canada's business environment is different from that of the United
States and merits individual analysis and study. Existing American
marketing programs must often be revised to conform with Canadian
economic conditions, tastes, customs, buying habits, investment capa-
bilities, currency differentials, sources of supply, and government regu-
lations and licensing requirements. One potential problem area deserv-
ing of thorough investigation is Canada's competition policy—in par-
ticular, legislation concerning unfair trade practices.
This article will outline the basic policies underlying Canadian
competition laws in general and the provisions regarding unfair trade
practices in particular. It will examine the efficiency with which the
existing machinery for enforcing these provisions carries competition
policy into effect. Special consideration will be given to potential changes
in the law embodied in the proposed Competition Act.
I. COMPETITION LEGISLATION: PRESENT AND FUTURE
Existing legislation pertaining to unfair trade practices is codified
entirely in the Combines Investigation Act, 2
 a statute of the Parliament
of Canada. The language of the Act, and its legislative and judicial
history reveal the lack of agreement as to the specific statutory intent.
This lack of agreement has given rise to a continuing controversy as to
whether the legislative objectives have been achieved and whether
amendment of the statute is required.
On its face, the Act prohibits certain practices that operate directly
or indirectly to reduce the level of free competition among private
enterprise. Thus, it appears to be based on the theory that the public
4' B.A.; LL.L.; Notary and Title Attorney, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
1 A governmental task force reported in 1968 that U.S. residents controlled 97%
of the capital employed in the manufacturing of automobiles, 90% in rubber, 54% in
chemicals and 66% in electrical appliances. It was further ascertained that foreign long
term direct investment in Canada grew from $2.7 billion in 1945 to $15.9 billion in
1964. Of this $15.9 billion, U.S. direct investment accounted for $12.9 billion or 80%.
Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry, Report of the Task Force,
Ottawa, 1968.
2 Combines Investigation Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. C-23 (1970).
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interest in efficient production, distribution, and consumption of goods
is best served by the natural functioning of competitive market forces.'
To accomplish this, the regulatory system attempts to ensure a diffusion
of economic power and to prevent the priVate imposition of artificial
economic restraints .4 The sanctions presently utilized are found exclu-
sively in the criminal law, for the constitutionality of the Combines In-
vestigation Act rests on the exclusive power of the Parliament to enact
criminal law.' Consequently, the present law tends to be quite rigid and
inflexible, since criminal offenses must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. This problem was highlighted in the Interim Report on Com-
petition Policy:
Courts have no latitude to consider all the economic and com-
mercial qualifications which might apply to particular cases
and are compelled to adopt an "all or nothing" approach in
deciding whether offences have been committed. In addition,
the classification of commercial arrangements as criminal has
created a bad psychological background for administra-
tion...."
The criminal law foundations of the Act also tend to give it a negative
posture, emphasizing punishment for improper conduct, rather than
reflecting a positive economic philosophy meant to induce proper con-
duct and to correct abuses.
In view of these shortcomings of the present Act, it was recom-
mended by the Interim Council that part of Canada's competition policy
3
 1970 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investiga-
tion Act at 9.
4
 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report - on Competition Policy at 6 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Interim Report].
6 R is to be noted that Canada's constitution is federal in nature, allocating
enumerated powers between the federal and provincial governments. Under section 91 of
the British North America Act, power is conferred on the Parliament of Canada to enact
laws, inter alia, in relation to criminal law and procedure. The anti-combines legislation,
as it exists today, has been held to be a valid exercise of the power of Parliament to
legislate in the field of criminal law. For further discussion of the constitutionality of
this legislation, see, In Re Board of Commerce Act and the Combines and Fair Prices
Act of 1919 [1919-20] 60 Can. S. Ct. 456 (1920); In Re A Reference as to the Validity
of the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 26, and of Section 498 of the Criminal
Code, [1929] Can. S. Ct. 409 (1929); Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. A.-G. Can.,
[1931] 2 D.L.R. 1 (1931). Reference Re Section 498A of the Criminal Code, [1936]
3 D.L.R. 593 (1936); A.-G. B.C. v. A.-G. Can. Reference Re Section 498A of the
Criminal Code, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 688 (1937); Reference Re Dominion Trade and Industry
Commission Act, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 607 (1936); A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can., Reference
Re Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Act, 1935, [19371 1 D.L.R. (1937);
Regina v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. [1954] aff'd sub nom. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. et al. v. The Queen, [1956] 2 D.L.R. (2d) 11 (1956);
46 D.L.R. (2d) 83 (1964), appeal dismissed, [1966] 58 D.L.R. (2d) 673 (1966).
8 Interim Report, supra note 4, at 109.
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be expressed as civil legislation.' Such a change would have the benefi-
cial effect of bringing the substance of the competition laws and the
procedures for implementing them more into line with the national
policy and principles upon which they are based.
It was against this background that the Competition Act was
introduced by the Canadian Minister of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs. 9
 The philosophy of the proposed legislation, which differs very
little from that of the Combines Investigation Act, is expressed in a
preamble to the bill:
Whereas competition in the private sector is ordinarily
the best means of allocating resources, of enhancing efficiency
in the production and distribution of goods and services and of
transmitting the benefits of efficiency to the public, and com-
petition also furthers individual enterprise by decentralizing
economic power and reducing the need for government inter-
vention in the achievement of economic objectives . . . . It
is therefore desirable to promote competition actively and also
to remove, throughout Canada, obstacles to competition .
created by [anti-competitive] practices, and such objectives
can only be achieved through the recognition, encouragement
and enforcement of the role of competition as a matter of
national policy . . . .9
Although the Competition Act is not modeled after any particular legis-
lation, Canadian or American, this preamble reveals an economic
rationale similar to that of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.
One of the most significant sections in the proposed Competition
Act provides machinery for enforcement through civil proceedings. Ac-
cordingly, mergers, specialization agreements, export agreements, fran-
chising agreements, price discrimination, promotional allowances, ex-
clusive dealing and tying arrangements, and refusal to deal—all of
which are important matters requiring sophisticated economic and
business analysis—will, if the bill is enacted, become the responsibility
of a special civil tribunal. On the other hand, certain proscribed prac-
tices such as price fixing, misleading advertising, and other predatory
7 Id.
8 Bill C-256, 28th Parl. 3d Sess. (1971). The Minister of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs, the Hon. Ron Basford, stated at the time of the initial presentation of the
bill for first reading that it would not be proceeded with, but allowed to die with the
third session of Parliament. Primarily, the intent was to present the bill as a starting
point, in order to initiate public discussion of the bill. It will most likely be reintro-
duced at a later session of Parliament in amended form. Thus, all references to the
proposed legislation should be understood as representing only the language of the draft
of the bill as originally introduced. -
Id.
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practices meant to injure a competitor will remain, as at present, within
the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts.
Despite the size and complexity of the proposed bill, the new legis-
lation does not represent a major departure from established Canadian
competition policy, but expresses a desire for precision and certainty
while maintaining flexibility." This flexibility is very aptly reflected in
the provisions concerning unfair trade practices, which would not be
treated as unlawful per se. Rather, the presumption would be that while
the practices could well be innocuous, or even beneficial to the public in
some circumstances, they could be harmful in others. It would be the
function of the new tribunal to determine, in view of the various eco-
nomic factors, when these trade practices become harmful and to im-
pose or recommend appropriate remedies. The sections of the article
which follow examine the various unfair trade practices in detail.
A. Price Discrimination
•
Section 34(1) of the Combines Investigation Act presently pro-
hibits a supplier of goods from discriminating in price among his com-
peting purchasers who are buying like quantity and quality of goods
from him." Under the statute, five factors must be present in order to
find a defendant guilty of price discrimination: (1) there must be
sales to two or more persons in order to afford a comparison; (2) there
must be a discount, rebate, allowance, price concession or other advan-
tage granted to one purchaser that is not made available to another;
(3) the persons among whom the supplier has discriminated must be
competitors; (4) the discriminatory prices must apply to *goods of like
quantity and quality; and (5) the discriminatory transaction must be
part of an overall practice of discrimination. Significantly, the price
discrimination section contains no provision for "cost justification,"
such as exists under the Clayton Act in the United States. Such a pro-
vision would allow a supplier who had made a practice of discriminating
to escape liability if he were merely passing on a cost saving to a cus-
tomer.
Although there have been no court cases concerning this section,
10 The Competition Act-Explanatory notes, The Minister of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs, June 29, 1971 at 1.
11 Can. Rev. Stat. c. C-23 g 34(1)(1970) provides:
Every one engaged in a business who (a) is a party or privy to or assists in, any
sale that discriminates to his knowledge, directly or indirectly, against com-
petitors of a purchaser of articles from him in that any discount, rebate, allow-
ance, price concession or other advantage is granted to the purchaser over and
above any discount, rebate, allowance, price concession or other advantage that,
at the time the articles are sold to such purchaser, is available to such competitors
in respect of a sale of articles of like quality and quantity;. . . . is guilty of an
indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
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questions as to its application have frequently been raised by business-
men during informal discussions with the Director of Investigations and
Research.12 These questions were partially answered during an investi-
gative inquiry conducted by the Director in 1966." In that case, it was
found that a dealer-classification system used by Miss Mary Maxim,
Ltd., a manufacturer and distributor of knitting yarns, was discrimina-
tory within the meaning of Section 34(1) (a) of the Act because dis-
counts granted to certain dealers were not made available to competing
retail store customers purchasing like volumes." The dealers were
classified according to Mary Maxim's estimate of the purchases that
each would make, and different discounts from retail prices, ranging
from thirty-six to forty-two percent, were granted depending on the
purchasing dealer's classification. The estimates utilized were made
without due regard for any definite period of time, and no subsequent
readjustment of prices was made at the end of a period based on actual
purchases during that period. In addition, there was no firm policy with
respect to the quantum of purchases that determined reclassification or
against which either actual or potential volume would be measured. The
report of the Director concluded that such discriminatory sales prac-
tices were clearly unjustified.'
Pursuant to his authority under Section 18 of the Act," the Di-
rector submitted this case to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commis-
sion for further consideration. The Commission concurred with the
determination of the Director, and further noted that a price concession
may be awarded only on the basis of the quantity of goods purchased at
a particular time or the volume of purchases within a definite period. In
12 To a considerable degree, the enforcement of the present Combines Investiga-
tion Act depends on the voluntary compliance of businessmen. The program of compliance
is one in which businessmen are encouraged by the Director of Investigation and
Research to discuss their problems with his department before they decide to implement
policies which might prove to be in conflict with the Act.
is A Report in the Matter of an Inquiry . Relating to the Distribution and Sale
of Mary Maxim Knitting Wool, Patterns and Accessories Thereof in Canada, 1966
Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act, at 58.
14 A discount applied to individual sales of a specified size is a quantity discount;
a discount applied to total purchases over a particular time period is a volume discount.
15 1966 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investiga-
tion Act, supra note 13, at 59.
It is difficult to conceive of a non-discriminatory plan of volume rebates where
the volume requirements are not clearly delineated and where no definite period
of time is specified within which the qualifying volume must be purchased, in
accordance with an objective and ascertainable system. Nor does it seem possible
to administer such a plan properly without a system whereby, at the end of the
specified period, each customer's purchases are compared with the volume set
for the appropriate discount or rebate catagory and readjustments made accord-
ingly ....
Id.	 •
15 Can. Rev. Stat. c. 28 § 18 (1970).
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addition, such concession must be available to all competing purchasers
who are "seeking to serve the same customers." 17
One of the key attributes of the provisions of the proposed Compe-
tition Act which deal with price discrimination is a clarity which un-
fortunately is lacking under the existing Section 34(1) (a). Basically,
the new provisions would forbid giving to one customer a price advan-
tage over his competitor by means of a lower price, discount, rebate,
allowance, or by any other device." However, the proposed legislation
provides for important exceptions to this general rule. For example,
there would be no price discrimination where price differentials result
from differences in delivery costs, where they are reasonably necessary
to assist entry into a new market, where no significant competitive
advantage is given to the favored customer, where a general reduction
of prices will result, or where the advantage is necessary to meet
import competition!' Where none of these justifying factors is found,
the Competitive Practices Tribunal may order the offending party to
cease such price discrimination and may issue a supplementary order
requiring that an injured customer be supplied on terms equivalent to
those received by other customers.
The objective of the proposed legislation is to avoid some of the
pitfalls prevalent, in analogous United States legislation such as the
1936 Robinson-Patman Act." This Act has been heavily criticized
by informed observers on the ground that it is unclear whether its
purpose is to suppress price discrimination where it operates as an
anticompetitive device, or to protect small business from price dis-
advantages.2' Furthermore, enforcement has concentrated on price
difference rather than price discrimination, and there have been several
administrative problems. As one commentator argues, Robinson-Pat-
man may have resulted in the suppression of some anticompetitive
pricing practices, but it has also prevented certain acceptable and
even desirable forms of differential pricing—e.g., those which can be
17 The Commission does not equate "available" to "must be offered" in the
sense that whether or not there is a practical possibility of his qualifying
for it, every quantity or volume discount. However, where a supplier provides
a discount on the basis of quantity or volume purchases he should be prepared
to provide any competing purchaser who makes an inquiry and who shows
reasonable prospect of being able to purchase like quantity or volume, all
information respecting the level of purchases required for eligibility for a discount
or rebate, the amount of the discount or rebate, the manner in which the discount
will be applied or the rebate paid, and of other details.
1966 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act,
at 59.
18 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. 38(1) (1971).
18 Bill C-256, 28th Parl. 3d Sess. § 38(2) (1971).
20 15 U.S.C. H 13a-c, 21a (1970). 	 -
21 C. Kaysen and D. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis
181 (1965).
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justified by cost differences, and those which constitute one of the
more important ways in which price competition periodically "breaks
out," in oligopolistic markets to the benefit of the consumer.22
B. Promotion Allowances
Under Section 35 of the Combines Investigation Act, any person
granting an allowance to a purchaser that is not offered on proportion-
ate terms to competing purchasers is guilty of an indictable offense.'
A promotional allowance, according to the Act, means a discount,
rebate, price concession or other advantage that is offered or granted
for advertising or display purposes, and is collateral to a sale of articles
but is not applied directly to the selling price. Only once has this
section been the subject of a court proceeding. 24 Two charges were
filed under section 35 against a greeting card distributor based on
payment of allowance to a retail outlet in Ottawa that was not offered
on proportionate terms to other purchasers of greeting cards who were
in competition with it. The court found, however, that the proprietor
of the outlet in question had, on his own initiative, suggested to the
seller a novel promotional scheme, and that the allowance he received
was, in fact, compensation for his efforts to develop new retail
marketing techniques for greeting cards. In acquitting the defendant
on the section 35 charges, the court held that
22
 A.D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the United States of America 463-69 (1960).
23
 Can. Rev. Stat. c., C-23 § 35 (1970) provides:
(1) In this section "allowance" means any discount, rebate, price concession
or other advantage that is or purports to be offered or granted for advertising
or display purposes and is collateral to a sale or sales of articles but is not
applied directly to the selling price.
(2) Every one engaged in a business who is a party or privy to the granting
of an allowance to any purchaser that is not offered on proportionate terms to
other purchasers in competition with thei first-mentioned purchaser (which
other purchasers are in this section called "competing purchasers"), is guilty
of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
(3) For the purpose of this section, an allowance is offered on proportionate
terms only if:
(a) The allowance offered to a purchaser is in approximately the same
proportion to the value of sales to him as the allowance offered to each compet-
ing purchaser is to the total value of sales to such competing purchaser;
(b) In any case where advertising or other expenditures or services are
exacted in return therefor, the cost thereof required to be incurred by a purchaser
is in approximately the same proportion to the value of sales to him as the cost of
such advertising or other expenditures or services required to be incurred by each
competing purchaser is to the total value of sales to such competing purchaser, and
(c) In any case where services are exacted in return therefor, the
requirements thereof have regard to the kinds of services that competing
purchasers at the same or different levels of distribution are ordinarily able
to perform or cause to be performed.
24 Regina v. William E. Coutts, Supreme Court of Ontario, 1966 (unreported).
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[W]hile in the correspondence such payment was referred
to as an advertising allowance, [the dealer] was in fact being
compensated for his original and experimental method of
testing the value of these new forms of offering [the defen-
dant's] cards to the public. None of the other competitors in
the sale of [the defendant's] cards attempted such a method
of increasing their sales, nor did they ask the accused com-
pany for such an allowance."
As in the case of price discrimination legislation, one of the
major difficulties of existing legislation concerning promotional allow-
ances is its lack of clarity. This is especially evident when one tries
to ascertain if a particular practice or plan involves the granting of
an "allowance" within the meaning of this section. To some extent,
the meaning of the term "allowance" has been clarified by inquiries
addressed to the'Director of Investigation and Research. For example,
in 1962 the Director was asked by a manufacturer of specialty food
products whether payments made to a promotional firm for advertise-
ments on a television program sponsored by a retail grocery chain
were promotional allowances paid to that chain within the meaning of
Section 35 of the Act." The Director found that the program was the
property of the promotional firm whose contract with the chain pro-
vided for a fixed payment by the latter. Originally all advertising was
on behalf of the chain. However, because the program involved
audience participation, it had wide appeal, and commercial spots were
sold by the promoting firm to other advertisers at prevailing com-
mercial rates. Amounts paid to the promoting firm by these other
advertisers were deducted from the sum otherwise payable by the
sponsoring chain to the promoting firm. As a result of increased partici-
pation by other advertisers, the cost of the program to the chain was
reduced. Most, but not all, of the other advertisers were suppliers of
the chain. The firm which brought the matter to the attention of the
Director wished to know if the suppliers of the chain who participated
as advertisers and made payments credited to the chain were obliged
to offer similar advantages to other customers. Some suppliers felt
that the program was really a promotion of the chain and that the
promoting firm served only to run the promotion and receive payments
from the chain. In defense, it was asserted that the chain was merely a
participant in a joint advertising plan for which it paid its share.
The Director concluded that it would be difficult to establish that
25 Id.
28 1964 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation
Act 44.
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the payments to the promoting firm by the other participating adver-
tisers were discounts, rebates, price concessions or other advantages
granted by the original sponsoring chain; nor was there any evidence
of pressure by that chain that would support a finding that a payment
so made was an allowance collateral to a sale. Finally, since the promo-
tion and sale of advertising time were carried out by a separate legal
entity totally unrelated to the chain, it did not appear that the pay-
ments were made for the purpose of having the chain carry out the
advertising or display. The Director therefore determined that the
plan did not involve the granting of an allowance within the meaning
of section 35.
The proposed legislation in the Competition Act concerning pro-
motional allowances 27 is based on the premise that such practices
ought not to be banned as offenses per se. Promotional allowances
would not be prohibited where they are designed to achieve one of
the purposes allowed under the price discrimination provision mentioned
previously.28 Only where there was reason to suppose that the use
of such an allowance in a particular situation might have a deleterious
effect on the public interest would it become the subject of further
investigation." The responsibility of the Competitive Practice Tribunal
would be to examine cases where harmful effects are suspected and to
impose or recommend appropriate remedies.
The proposed legislation follows closely the Economic Council's
recommendation that the paramount consideration for the Tribunal
must be whether the practice was likely to lessen competition to the
detriment of the final consumer." The interest of particular competi-
tors would be secondary. It appears that the Tribunal would be
entrusted with substantial discretionary powers. In effect, the Tribunal
would have the power to dictate many of the terms on which business
is conducted in Canada and substantially shape the future of Canadian
industry. For example, in the exceptional cases where promotional
allowances would be permitted by the Competition Act, such allow-
ances must be "reasonable in time and quantity." The Act, however,
27 Section 39 of the proposed Competition Act provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), for the purpose of section 37, "promotional
allowance" means any benefit that purports to be or is offered or granted by a
supplier to a person who deals in commodities or services of the supplier in
consideration of the advertising, display or other promotion by that person of
any such commodities or services.
(2) A benefit is not a promotional allowance if it meets one or more of the
conditions described in paragraphs 38(2) (b) or (e) and (1).
28 See text at p. 1308 supra.
29 Interim Report, supra note 4, at 120.
88 Id. at 122.
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does not specify what is meant by "reasonable" and this would
presumably be left to the Tribunal.
Another disturbing aspect of the new legislation is that a regular
purchaser buying in large quantities is not entitled to a better unit
price than a random purchaser buying one small consignment. The
elimination of the quantity of purchases as a price factor seems to
contradict one of the basic elements of business practice in Canada.
No doubt, before the bill is finally passed, many of these provisions
will be challenged by various Canadian pressure groups.
C. Misleading Price Advertising
Section 36 of the Combines Investigation Act is designed to pro-
tect consumers by making it an offense to misrepresent the regular
price of an article. Under this section, an offense has been committed
when a "materially misleading representation" has been made (1) to
the public, (2) for the purpose of promoting the sale or use of an
article, and (3) concerning the price at which the article has been, is
or will ordinarily be sold!' Such misrepresentation is an offense per
se and no mens rea need be shown.82
One of the principal difficulties arising out of section 36 is that
of identifying a "materially misleading representation." It has been
held that the term "misleading" denotes "a representation which is
calculated to and in effect does, lead a person to a certain course of
conduct because he believes the information put before him indicates
that this would be advantageous to himself." 88 In deciding whether
such a misleading representation is material, "the criteria [sic] . . .
is not the value to the purchaser, but rather the degree to which the
21 Can. Rev. Stat. c. C-23 § 36(1) (1970).
22 There is nothing in the express language of s. 33C(1) [now 36(1)] disclosing
any intention that mens rea, in the sense that the materially misleading
representation made must be known to be such by the accused, is not an
essential ingredient of the offence. But it is submitted that such an intention
is derived by necessary implication from s-s.(2). If it is necessary to the offence'
that the accused knows the representation he makes is in fact materially mis-
leading a publisher who accepted an advertisement in good faith for publication
in the ordinary course of business would not require the special defence
provided by s-s.(2). It is therefore concluded that a. 33C(I) [now 36(1)] is an
offence,of strict liability and that mens rea, in the sense I have mentioned, is not
an ingredient of the offence.... To paraphrase the words of Farell, L. J. at p. 481
of Hobbs v. Winchester Corp., [1910] 2 K.B. 471, in my opinion the Legislature
intended that the maker of a materially misleading representation should take the
risk and that the public should be protected irrespective of the guilt or
innocence of the maker subject to the exception provided by s-s. 2.
Regina v. Allied Towers Merchants Ltd., [1965] 2 O.R. 628 (1965).
22 Regina v. Patton's Place Ltd., 11969] 57 C.P.R. 12, 16 (1968).
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purchaser is affected by these words in coming to a conclusion as to
whether or not he should make a purchase.""
Unlike the provisions of the Act previously discussed, Section 36
has been the object of much litigation, and a number of general prin-
ciples have emerged from these cases. The advertising of articles for
sale at "regular prices" which in fact are higher than those prevailing
in the advertiser's selling area is a misleading representation concern-
ing the price at which goods are ordinarily sold." It is also an offense
for a manufacturer to intentionally suggest unrealistically high retail
prices which a knowing retailer can then use to persuade prospective
purchasers that they would be buying advantageously if they acquired
the article for substantially less than that amount.' Similarly, pre-
ticketing with a "regular" or "list" price designed to be marked down
by the retailer so as to imply the customer is receiving a bargain when
in fact the regular price was not prevailing in the selling area is pro-
hibited." A "guarantee," whatever it may involve, can have no effect
on the price of an article." The word "value" may only be used to
refer to the price at which articles have been, are, or will ordinarily
34 Regina v. Kelly's on Seymour Ltd., [1970] 60 C.P.A. 24, 26 (1969).
85 Regina v. Eddie Black's Ltd., [1962] 38 C.P.R. 140, 141 (1962). This case con-
cerned the advertising of photographic and other items at "sale" prices alleged to be con-
siderably below "regular" prices. These alleged "regular" prices, however, were in fact
higher than the ordinary prevailing retail prices in the advertiser's selling area. On the
basis of this decision the Director has taken the position that "the so-called regular price
must be the price at which the goods have actually been sold by the majority of the
dealers in the market in question. It is not sufficient, therefore, that one or two qualifying
sales have been made by the seller himself at the so-called regular price." 1967 Report of
the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act at 63.
IA Regina v. Allied Towers Merchants, Ltd., County Court of the County of Went-
worth, Ontario, March 17, 1965 (unreported). In this case, the charges arose out of an
advertisement in a newspaper describing a camera with a "list price" of $199.95 and a
projector with a "list price" of $69.50. The advertisement offered the camera for $129.88
and the projector for $42.88. It was held that the manufacturer was not guilty of dis-
honesty or bad faith in suggesting the retail prices. However, the use of the words "list
price" was held to be a violation of section 33C since it suggested that this was the price
at which the goods were sold in the advertiser's selling area. See also Regina v. Ace
Liquidators Ltd. (unreported) analyzed briefly in 1967 Report of the Director of In-
vestigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act at 63.
87 Regina v. Imperial Industries (unreported). See 1967 Report of the Director of
Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act at 65.
38 Regina v. Trans-Canada Jewelry, 1968 B.R. 179. In that case a man's watch was
offered for sale at $27 under the representation that it regularly retailed for $54. Inquiries
revealed that watches of this quality would not ordinarily be sold in the selling area for
$54. The defendant company argued that the quoted regular retail price was not mis-
leading because it included a 5 year guarantee. The court, however, reasoned that "if in
fact, this guarantee meant that the buyer could have it repaired free of charge for a
period of five years, this would be a service which he was buying and the value of the
article would not be affected by it. If this watch had been purchased for $54, the buyer
would be paying $27 for the article and $27 for the five years service. It would not, then,
be the article which sold for $54.00."
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be sold." It is no defense for an advertiser to prove that he did not
know that his representation was misleading.4°
Most of these principles have been embodied in section 20(7) of
the proposed Competition Act." Under the proposed legislation, the
"ordinary," "usual," "normal," or other price used in advertising,
packaging or other forms of promotion to show a price reduction must
be the price at which the product ordinarily was sold during a period
of sixty days preceding the offered reduction in the same marketing
vicinity as the sale price. If the total of the price at which the com-
modity is offered and the announced price reduction is greater than
the actual ordinary selling price in the sixty day period, it is conclu-
sive proof of a misleading representation.42
It is submitted, therefore, that practices by manufacturers such
as "cents-off," "special price," or other promotional techniques relat-
ing to prices on packaging or used in the various forms of advertising,
will require great care. The test for ordinary price is a local one and
it would be necessary for a producer to know the price normally charged
for his product in various markets or segments of markets, to be cer-
at)
 Regina v. Thomas Sales Agencies (1963) Ltd., [1969] 2 O.R. 587 (1969). In that
case a company manufacturing shampoo marked on the labels, "$3.00 VALUE/SPECIAL
PRICE $1.99." The company admitted that this shampoo never sold for $3.00 and in
fact had always sold for $1.99 or less. The Court of Appeal, reversing a lower court
acquittal, stated:
[I]n the context herein ... the word "value" must be given its ordinary mean-
ing—exchangeable value—the price in the market. This market price has been
established for a period of four or five years at $1.99. It was a materially mis-
leading representation to say ... "special price $1.99" when in fact this was the
regular or ordinary price. Conjoined, these statements tended to suggest a one-
third discount from regular price.
40 See note 32 supra.
41 Bill C-256, 28th Pad. 2d Sess. g 20(7) (1971) provides:
Where (a) a commodity, (b) a wrapper or container of a commodity, (c) any-
thing attached to, inserted in or accompanying a commodity or its wrapper or
container, (d) anything on which a commodity is mounted for display or sale,
(a) any in-store or point-of-purchase display of a commodity, or (f) any adver-
tisement relating to a commodity or service, carries a representation to the effect
that the commodity or service is being offered at a reduction from the ordinary
price thereof, any person who displays the commodity or offers or advertises the
commodity or service for sale shall be deemed, for the purpose of paragraph
(1) (d), to have made a representation to t, the public that the commodity or ser-
vice has been ordinarily sold at a price calculated by adding to the price at which
the commodity or service is actually being sold, offered or advertised for sale the
amount of the apparent reduction, and Unless such person establishes that the
commodity or service was ordinarily sold , in the vicinity in which he carries on
business or in which he published the advertisement or by him at or above the
price so calculated within sixty days preceding the date upon which he deemed
to have made the representation, the price so calculated shall be conclusively
deemed to be higher than the price at .which the commodity or service was
ordinarily sold.
42 The Competition Act—Explanatory Notes, The Minister of Consumer and Cor-
porate Affairs at 95 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Explanatory Notes].
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tain an advertised price reduction would comply with the Act. The
prohibition applies to all participants in the distribution system, from
manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer."
It is to be noted that misleading price representation would,
under the proposed law, still be considered a criminal offense and thus
be subject to criminal proceedings. It would seem that the new pro-
visions aim to counter-balance the omission of possible proceedings
based on "unfair methods of competition," such as exists under Sec-
tion 5 of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act. Under existing
Canadian legislation, legal proceedings may only be launched to the
extent that such practices are specifically prohibited by the Combines
Investigation Act.
D. Misleading Advertising
The provisions concerning false and misleading advertising are
currently contained in Section 37 of the Combines Investigation Act,"
which was formerly Section 306 of'the Criminal Code. Under the au-
thority granted by this section, the Director established an initial set
of misleading advertising categories." The purpose of these categories
43 Id. at 96.
44 Can. Rev. Stat. c. C-23 § 37 (1970) provides as follows:
(1) Every one who publishes or causes to be published an advertisement
containing a statement that purports to be a statement of fact but that is untrue,
deceptive or misleading or is intentionally so worded or arranged that it is de-
ceptive or misleading, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprison-
ment for five years, if the advertisement is published
(a) to promote directly or indirectly, the sale or disposal of property
or any interest therein, or
(b) to promote a business or commercial interest.
(2) Every one who publishes or causes to be published in an advertise-
ment a statement or guarantee of the performance, efficacy or length of life of
anything that is not based upon an adequate and proper test of that thing, the
proof of which lies upon the accused, is, if the advertisement is published to
promote, directly or indirectly the sale or disposal of that thing, guilty of an
offence punishable on summary conviction.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a person who publishes an
advertisement that he accepts in good faith for publication in the ordinary course
of his business.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), a test that is made by the National
Research Council of Canada or by any other public department is an, adequate
and proper test, but no reference shall be made in an advertisement to indicate
that a test has been made by the National Research Council of Canada or by
any other public department unless the advertisement has, before publication,
been approved and permission to publish it has been given in writing by the
President of the National Research Council or by the deputy head of the public
department, as the case may be.
(5) Nothing in subsection (4) shall be deemed to exclude, for the purposes
of this section, any other adequate or proper test.
45 The categories are as follows:
(a) A misleading statement of fact in an advertisement (e.g., "Below our cost" when
the selling price is in fact higher than the delivered price of the article to the retailer);
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was to give notice to advertisers of the particular advertising prac-
tices which would be considered violative of section 37. However, the
plethora of complaints received by the Director in the year following
the passage of the Act" indicated that the Act and the categories pro-
mulgated under it were insufficient to provide advertisers with a clear
understanding as to which practices constituted misleading advertis-
ing. Even today, misleading advertising continues to present problems
by distorting free competition and bringing adverse publicity to the
market as a whole.
In order to remedy the problem, Section 20 of the Competition
Act" proposes to clarify the intent of existing legislation by providing
(b) a statement of performance which is not supported by an adequate test (e.g., rope
advertised as "2,000 pound test" where no adequate and proper test of the rope has been
made); (c) deceptive use of contests (e.g., "You are the lucky winner of our grand award"
when in fact the "award" was not exceptional in that many people received the identical
mailing piece) ; (d) "free" offers that are not in fact free (e.g., receipt of the "free" gift
is contingent on the purchase of another article or articles which could be purchased
through conventional channels at lower prices); (e) "bait-and-switch" operations where
the item used as bait was not in fact held for sale by the advertiser; (f) contest purporting
to award prizes where such prizes are in fact available; (g) the "stuffed flat" (e.g., an
advertiser using the classified section purports to be selling his household furniture
whereas in fact he is selling goods supplied from other sources; (h) "clip-and-paste" solic-
itations (this is a direct mail device in which typically the customer is invited to verify
a listing in a directory but which when signed and returned amounts to an order for
which he may be invoiced; (I) misrepresentation as to origin (e.g., a manufacturer en-
closes a foreign made article in a display package marked "made in Canada").
40
 Twelve months after this section was proclaimed as part of the Combines In-
vestigation Act, some 1,000 complaints were received. Many of these complaints were
multiple in nature and involved a number of promotional schemes widely advertised in
direct mail announcements. Others focused on the exaggerated or nonexistent performance
of the commodity to be sold. For example, it was brought to the attention of the Director
that an advertisement on an Ottawa television station promoted the sale at the Central
Canada Exhibition of an article described as a "jet ignition unit with transistors," manu-
factured by United Automotive Manufacturing, Inc. The advertisement contained the
statement that the unit was "engineered to give better gas mileage, easier starting and
better performance." Tests revealed that the claims made in the advertisement could not
be substantiated and the device was useless. Other complaints brought to the attention
of the Director centered around misleading advertising which promised the consumer
savings if he purchased from the advertising store. For example, a gasoline station ad-
vertised that if a customer purchased gasoline from them he would save six cents per
gallon. However, it was revealed that the customer received only a six cent coupon which
could be used on the purchase of anything bought at the station with the exception of
gasoline. 1970 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research at 69.
4T Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sass. § 20(1) (1971) provides:
No person shall, for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the supply
or use of a commodity or service or for the purpose of promoting, directly or in-
directly any business interest, by any means whatsoever,
(a) make a misleading representation to the public;
(b) make representation to the public as to the performance, efficacy or
length of life of a commodity or service that is not based upon a reasonable test;
(c) make a representation to the public in a form that purports to be
(i) a warranty or guarantee of a commodity or service,
(ii) a promise to replace, maintain or repair a commodity or any part
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a more precise statement as to the practices which constitute mislead-
ing advertising and are thus prohibited. In addition, the proposed leg-
islation widens the scope of responsibility for misleading advertising
by extending liability to retailers as well as wholesalers." Thus, through
more precise definition and extended responsibility, the new legislation
proposes to eliminate misleading representations before they can in-
fluence market decisions.
E. Resale Price Maintenance
Section 38 of the Combines Investigation Act prohibits a manu-
facturer or supplier from requiring or inducing one who purchases his
goods for resale to resell an item at or above a specified price, nor may
a dealer refuse to supply a customer who refuses to resell his goods
at or above a specified price 4° The evils of resale price maintenance
thereof or to repeat or continue a service until it has achieved a specified
result
if such form of purported warranty or guarantee or promise is misleading or if
there is no reasonable prospect that it will be carried out; or
(d) make a representation to the public concerning the price at which a com-
modity or service or like commodities or services have been, are or will be or-
dinarily supplied where such representation is misleading.
See also Explanatory Notes, supra note 42, at 94.
48 For example, if the misleading representation is made on the container of the
commodity, the person offering the commodity for sale is guilty of an offense.
49 Can. Rev, Stat, c. C-23 § 38 (1970) provides:
(1) In this section "dealer" means a person engaged in the business of
manufacturing or supplying or selling any article or commodity.
(2) No dealer shall directly or indirectly by agreement, threat, promise or
any other means whatsoever, require or induce or attempt to require or induce
any other person to resell an article or commodity
(a) at a price specified by the dealer or established by agreement,
(b) at a price not less than a minimum price specified by the dealer or
established by agreement,
(c) at a markup or discount specified by the dealer or established by
agreement,
(d) at a markup not less than a minimum markup specified by the
dealer or established by agreement, or
(e) at a discount not greater than a maximum discount specified by
the dealer or established by agreement, whether such markup or discount or
minimum markup or maximum discount is expressed as a percentage or
otherwise.
(3) No dealer shall refuse to sell or supply an article or commodity to any
other person for the reason that such other person
(a) has refused to resell or to offer for resale the article or commodity
(i) at a price specified by the dealer or established by agreement,
(ii) at a price not less than a minimum price specified by the dealer
or established by agreement,
(iii) at a markup or discount specified by the dealer or established
by agreement,
(iv) at a markup not less than a minimum markup specified by the
dealer or established by agreement, or
(v) at a discount not greater than a maximum discount specified
by the dealer or established by agreement; or
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may 'best be illustrated by the practice of co-operative advertising.
Under such a plan the supplier contributes one half of the retailer's
cost of advertising, provided that the sale price stated in the advertise-
ment is the price designated by the supplier. Failure to use the desig-
nated price results in loss of the advertising funds, thus inducing the
retailer to resell at what may be an artificially inflated price. Since an
inducement to advertise at a specified price has the same potentially
deleterious effect on commerce as an inducement to sell at a specified
price, it is therefore a violation of Section 38(2) of the Combines In-
vestigation Act."
Despite the language of section 38 prohibiting resale price main-
tenance, the law permits a manufacturer or other supplier to suggest
resale prices for his products, to give advice to retailers about resale
prices, and in some instances, to encourage retailers to adopt resale
prices suggested by the supplier as long as such efforts do not reach
the state of requiring or inducing, or attempting to require or induce,
a retailer to accept a specified price or discount." In addition, Section
38(5) of the Combines Investigation Act provides four defenses for
a supplier charged with a refusal to sell. The defendant must "satisf [37]
the court that he and anyone upon whose report he depended had
reasonable cause to believe and did believe" that his customer was
using the article as a loss-leader, for bait-and-switch selling, in mis-
leading advertising, or was not providing adequate service in connec-
tion with sales of the article. This provision represents a legislative
condemnation of advertising schemes in which a retailer sells an item
below cost in order to attract customers to his store for the purpose of
selling him other goods instead of (bait and switch) or in addition to
(loss leading) that' which was advertised." The continued use of a
particular item as a loss-leader may cause other retailers to discon-
tinue the marketing of the item and may eventually lead to the elim-
ination of competition." Thus, the supplier's refusal to sell to a par-
ticular retailer whom he suspects of this practice is considered to be
predicated upon a desire to retain a fair price and wide distribution
(b) has resold or offered to resell the article or commodity
(i) at a price less than a price or minimum price specified by the
dealer or established by agreement,
(ii) at a markup less than a markup or minimum markup specified
by the dealer or established by agreement, or
(iii) at a discount greater than a discount or maximum discount
specified by the dealer or established by agreement.
50 Can. Rev. Stat. c. C-23 § 38(2) (1970). See also Regina v. Moffats Ltd., [1957)
O.R. 93 (1956) and Regina v. British Oil Co., Magistrate's Court, Toronto, March 10, 1961
(unreported), for examples of cases decided under § 38 of the Combines Investigation Act.
51 Regina v. Philips Appliances Ltd., [1969] 2 D.L.R. (3d. ed.) 558.
52 Id.
53 Regina v. William E. Coutts Co., Sup. Ct. of Ont., Oct. 17, 1966 (unreported).
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for his product rather than upon a desire to maintain an artificially
high price.
The legislation proposed in the Competition Act expands the def-
inition of resale price maintenance to include the practice of manu-
facturers and suppliers of advertising and packaging their goods with
a "suggested retail price" as an inducement "to influence upward" the
retailer's *price.64
 Suggested minimum resale prices would be permitted
only where the supplier clearly indicated that the product could be
sold at a lower price and no penalties would be incurred by the re-
tailer for non-compliance.' Only the retailer would be permitted to
64 Bill C-256, 28th Pad., 3d Sess. § 18 (1971) provides;
(1) No person engaged in the business of producing or supplying a com-
modity within or without Canada or who has, within or without Canada, the
exclusive rights and privileges conferred by a patent, trade mark, copyright or
industrial design shall, either directly or indirectly,
(a) by any means whatever, whether taken within or without Canada,
attempt to influence upward, or to discourage the reduction of, the price at
which any other person engaged in business in Canada sells or offers for sale
or advertises for a sale a commodity within Canada; or
(b) refuse to supply a commodity to any other person engaged in
business in Canada because of the low price at which the other person
(1) has previously sold or offered for sale or advertised a commodity
within Canada, or
(ii) proposes to sell or offer for sale or advertise a commodity
within Canada.
(2) Subsection (I) does not apply where the person attempting to influence
the conduct of another person or the person refusing to supply a commodity to
another person and that other person arc directors, officers or employees of
(a) the same company, partnership or sole proprietorship; or
(b) companies, partnerships, or sole proprietorships that are affiliated.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a suggestion by a producer or a supplier
of a commodity of a resale price or minimum resale price with regard thereto,
however arrived at, is, in the absence of .evidence that the person making the
suggestion, in so doing, also made it clear to the person to whom the suggestion
was made that he was under no obligation to accept the suggestion and would
in no way suffer in his business relations with the person making the suggestion
or with any other person if he failed to accept the suggestion, proof of an at-
tempt to influence the person to whom the suggestion is made in accordance with
the suggestion.
(4) For the purposes of this section,
(a) the placing by a producer or supplier of a commodity of a price or
suggested price on the commodity or its container by direct application or
by attaching thereto a ticket or otherwise, is an attempt to influence upward
the price at which any retailer, into whose hands the commodity comes, sells
the commodity; and
(b) any advertisement of a commodity published in Canada by a sup-
plier other than a retailer, that mentions a retail or suggested retail price
for the commodity, is an attempt to influence upward the price at which
any retailer into whose hands the commodity comes, sells the commodity;
unless, in the case of a suggested retail price, the suggested price is so ex-
pressed as to make clear to any person to whose attention it comes, that it
is a suggested price only and that the commodity may be sold at a lesser
price.
56 For example, the requirements of the law could be met by a label stating the sug-
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advertise or quote a firm price on anything from cars to chewing gum.
The justification for the new provisions has been described as follows:
Suggested resale s price can have advantages in providing an
indication of the price a product might . reasonably sell for in
terms of its cost and value. This is particularly true in the
case of smaller sellers faced with the task of working out in-
dividual prices on relatively small quantities of many items.
With no other qualification, "suggested price" and other sim-
ilar terms create the impression that the price quoted is the
fair and prevailing price and thus has an influence on both
seller and purchaser to accept it or a price close to it. The in-
fluence becomes even stronger when the "suggested price" is
used in advertising and packaging. With no clear indication
that the "suggested price" does not necessarily represent the
price at which the product is ordinarily sold, therefore, this
could be used as an indirect device to influence the selling
price."
Significantly, the prohibition of the proposed Act would not extend
to the labelling or advertising of maximum suggested resale prices.
In comparing the existing law with the proposed legislation, it is
to be noted that the use of a "suggested resale price" to indirectly in-
fluence resale prices is not expressly mentioned in the Combines In-
vestigation Act and the use of a suggested price would never constitute
an offense unless an attempt were made to enforce it. The prohibition
in the Competition Act, however, specifically includes indirect as well
as direct attempts to maintain or influence upwards the price of an
article. Under existing legislation, improper conduct by a retailer with
respect to a particular item may be raised by a supplier only in defense
to disprove the allegation of "denial of supply for price maintenance
reasons." The new Act, however, specifically deals with such activities
as bait-and-switch selling and misleading advertising. These things
would themselves become offenses which could be proceeded against
dirèctly. At the present time, the opportunity to discipline a retailer by
cutting off supply permits abuses of resale price maintenance to occur
under the guise of these reasons for refusal to supply." Under the pro-
posed Competition Act, if such a complaint were raised in defense, the
gested price as "less than $10." In addition, a supplier who refuses to deal with a retailer
for not accepting 'a minimum resale price suggestion can be required, under other sec-
tions of the Combines Investigation Act, to provide the goods refused as well as pay
damages resulting from the illegal refusal to supply.
50 Explanatory Notes, supra note 42, at 87.
57 Id. at 87-90.
1320
CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
defendant might well be called upon to respond as to why he had not
already brought an action directly against the offending retailer.
F. Collusive Marketing and Price Agreements
Section 32 of the Combines Investigation Act" prohibits collusive
marketing and price agreements which are designed to "unduly" lessen
or limit competition. The interpretation of the word "unduly" has
caused the courts some difficulty, but the tendency has been to define
"unduly" in terms of the degree of control exercised within a particular
market." However, the percentage of the market which must be shown
to be under the control of the conspirators has never been specifically
determined and has ranged from eighty or ninety percent" to fifty-six
or seventy-four percent.°'
Section 16(1) of the proposed Competition Act" is designed to al-
68 Can. Rev. Stat. c. C-23 § 32 (1970) provides:
(1) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another
person
(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manu-
facturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any article,
(b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production
of an article, or to enhance unreasonably the price thereof,
(c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manu-
facture, purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply of an
article, or in the price of insurance upon persons or property, or
(d) to restrain or injure trade or commerce in relation to any article, is
guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
59 Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. v. The Queen, 1957 S.C.R. 403. However, earlier
decisions focused on the word "express" in interpreting "unduly." The King v. Elliott, 90
L.R. 648, 657 (1905). It would seem that the qualifying word "unduly" in the existing
section 32, however, has not been interpreted by the courts in a manner that allows
meaningful reference to case law to determine if a proposed action would be considered
illegal by the courts. Explanatory Notes, supra note 42, at 80.
00 Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. v. The Queen, [1957] Can. S. Ct. 403 (1956).
el Regina v. Abitibi Power & Paper Co., 131 C.C.C. 201 (1960).
02 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 16(1) (1971) provides:
(1) No person shall conspire, combine, agree or arrange with another person,
(a) to fix or determine, in any manner whatever, the minimum price or
any other term or condition at or upon which any commodity or service
will be supplied or the maximum price or any other term or condition at or
upon which a commodity or service will be acquired by such persons to or
from any other person, whether determined or undetermined,
(b) to fix or determine, in any manner whatever, the minimum price
or any other term or condition at or upon which a tender will be submitted
for the acquisition of a commodity or service or to refrain or cause any
other person to refrain from submitting such a tender,
(c) to divide or allocate between or among themselves any market for
the acquisition or supply of a commodity or service,
(d) to lessen or limit the production of a commodity or service, or the
supply of a commodity or service for or in any market,
(e) to lessen or limit the quality, grades or kinds of a commodity or
service that is or are supplied to or may be acquired in any market,
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leviate the problem of determining the legislative intent behind the word
"unduly." This objective is accomplished by specifying ten types of
agreements°3 which are prohibited per se, thereby eliminating the
necessity of examining the degree of market control in order to deter-
mine if an agreement "unduly" lessens competition. The precise ad-
umbration of the prohibited agreeMents enables businessmen to formu-
late their market conduct along clear guidelines.
There are a number of exceptions to the general rules laid down
under section 16 which are meant to exempt agreements not necessarily
anti-competitive in themselves or which, although they have the ap-
parent effect of limiting competition, are nonetheless considered neces-
sary and even beneficial to legitimate Canadian economic objectives.
These exceptions are as follows: (a) agreements between directors or
officers of a company, the company and its subsidiaries, or subsidiaries
of the same parent company;" (b) specialization, export, or franchise
agreements registered with the Tribunal; es
 (c) joint venture agreements
relating to a single project that is established as being impractical for
any of the participants to undertake alone and where full disclosure
of the agreements has been made in advance to all interested parties;"
(d) agreements relating to cooperation between competitors for the
purpose of promoting efficiency, or collaboration on other matters of
a non-competitive nature, including the exchange of statistics not re-
lating to specific business transactions or customers, the definition of
product standards and commercial terminology, the exchange of credit
information, cooperation in research and development, and restriction
of advertising or other promotions not related to prices;" (e) joint
purchasing agreements designed to reduce delivery costs and to
(f) to lessen or limit facilities for the production, acquisition, supply
or distribution of a commodity or service for or in any market,
(g) to lessen or limit the channels or methods of acquisition, supply or
distribution of a commodity or service for or in any market,
(h) to prevent or impede the entry of any person into, or the expansion
of the business of any person in, any market,
(i) to cause any person to abandon or withdraw from any market, or
(j) to boycott the suppliers or acquirers of a commodity or service to
or in any market,
and no person shall do anything within Canada that is directed to the imple-
mentation of a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement, wherever
entered into, that has, is intended to have or, if implemented would be likely to
have, in Canada, one or more of the effects described in paragraphs (a) to (j).
(13
 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. §§ 16(a)-(j) (1971).
64 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 16(3)(a) (1971).
65 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. 11 16(3)(6) (1971).
66 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 16(3) (c) (1971).
87
 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 16(3)(d) (1971). This prohibition represents a
continuation, with certain changes, of an existing policy established by Section 32 of the
Combines Investigation Act.
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facilitate economically beneficial buying practices; °8 (f) consumer boy-
cotts;" (g) normal market arrangements between a supplier and his
customer regarding the definition of sales territories, product lines, and
similar matters; 7° and (h) covenants not to compete for a certain
period or in a certain area contained in contractual agreements relating
to the sale of a business, the sale or leasing of business premises, or
employment contracts. (This final exception, however, does not apply
when one of the parties to the contract is in a monopoly position as
defined in the Act.) 71
G. Tied Sales, Directed Selling, Exclusive Dealing, and Reciprocal
Buying
Since the Combines Investigation Act makes no express provision
for exclusive dealing, tied sales, directed selling or reciprocal buying,
a supplier in Canada is not presently required to sell to all comers."'
Tying arrangements have existed to a very large extent in Canada in
the distribution and sale of automotive oils, greases, anti-freeze, addi-
tives, tires, batteries, accessories, and related products. Unfortunately,
there have been no convictions up to now concerning this practice
within the oil industry. 73
The proposed. Section 40 of the Competition Ace' addresses the
shortcomings of existing legislation by clearly defining tied sales,
08
 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 16(3) (e) (1971),
89 Bill C-256, 28th Part, 3d Sess. # 16(3)(f) (1971).
7° Bill C-256, 28th Part., 3d Sess. § 16(3) (g) (1971).
71
 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 16(4) (1971).
72 However, if the supplier enjoys a monopoly position, section 33 might apply, in
that such a supplier would be viewed as owing a greater obligation to supply potential
purchasers than if he were merely one among a number of vigorous competitors. See note
11 supra.
78 It is interesting to note that in 1962 an inquiry was held by the Restrictive Trade
Practice Commission concerning the distribution of these products, and one of the recom-
mendations made by the Commission was the following:
[Thati definitions of exclusive dealing and tying arrangements be included in the
Combines Investigation Act which would embrace policies involved in full line
forcing and directed buying as disclosed in the inquiry and that there should be
a prohibition of exclusive selling and tying arrangements as defined, which are
likely to lessen competition substantially, tend to create a monopoly or exclude
competitors from the market to a significant degree. That arrangements or agree-
ments which give one or more suppliers exclusive or preferred access to a group
of outlets in return for a commission on Sales to such agreements or arrangements
are likely to lessen competition substantially, tend to create a monopoly or exclude
from the market to a significant degree competitors.
Report: On an Inquiry into the Distribution and Sale of Automotive Oils, Creases, Anti-
Freeze, Additives, Tires, Batteries, Accessories and Related Products: Restrictive Trade
Practice Commission, Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, 1962, at 133. The Interim Report of the
Economic Council of Canada, at 120-23, maintained that such agreements or arrange-
ments should not be treated as undersirable "per se," but should be analyzed on their in-
dividual merits.
74 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 40 (1971).
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directed selling, exclusive dealing, reciprocal buying and refusal to
sell, and by permitting the court to forbid these selling practices, where
the seller or supplier "is able to influence significantly either the price
or volume" in a given market. These activities are grouped together
in the Act by virtue of the restrictive effect they have on the relation-
ship between a customer and his suppliers; consequently, in situations
where tied sales and exclusive dealing do not constitute a restrictive
practice, they are not prohibited. Such a situation exists where there
are technological relationships between the products or services in-
volved, franchise agreements or other arrangements by which two or
more businesses operate under a common trade designation, or a new
firm or product enters into an existing market. In the event that the
Tribunal finds a restrictive practice has been pursued, it can enjoin
such practice and issue supplementary orders requiring goods to be
supplied to the injured party under normal terms and conditions.
It may also order modifications of any patent, trademark or other
similar rights that are involved in a restrictive practice.
II. ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMPETITION LAWS
Under the Combines Investigation Act, responsibility for enforce-
ment of the provisions regarding unfair trade practices is divided
among the Director, the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission and
the courts.
Pursuant to Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, the Director is required
to investigate instances of restrictive practices and to commence a
formal inquiry whenever he has "reason to believe that an offense
against the Act has been or is about to be committed." In practice,
most such inquires are initiated as a result of an informal complaint,
a letter, or other source of information coming to the attention of the
Director. 1 Furthermore, the statute permits any six Canadian citizens
to instigate an investigative proceeding by addressing a formal appli-
cation to the Director's attention. If the application has merit, the
Minister of Justice may then instruct the Director to commence an
inquiry. It is to be noted that the Director does not act as agent for
the complainant in conducting an inquiry arising from a complaint,
and he will not automatically effect the desired relief.
Although the proposed Competition Act changes the title of the
Director to "Commissioner," his duties and powers would remain sub-
stantially unchanged. However, the Act would expand the role of the
Commissioner by enabling him to provide businessmen with a more
precise statement of the legal status of a proposed activity." For
76 It has been pointed out that
[T]he certainty of the prohibitions and the heavier reliance on civil procedures
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example, if a company felt that a proposed activity might violate the
Act, it could seek a registered exemption from the Competitive Practices
Tribunal." The Commissioner could, at the same time, give a precise
indication of the conditions under which he would not oppose the appli-
cation. In effect, the Competition Act would enable the Commissioner
to place greater emphasis on prevention of contraventions through
co-operation and consultation with businessmen, and also to settle actual
cases through use of the consent order."
will enable the Commissioner to place more emphasis on assisting business in
complying with the Act than is now possible. Under the existing Act the useful-
ness of discussions on proposed business activity is limited since branch officials
cannot anticipate conclusively how the courts might rule and can thus only in-
dicate whether or not the Director would commence an inquiry.
Explanatory Notes, supra note 42, at 35.
76 The procedure of registration has been introduced into the proposed Act. As a
general principle, all agreements restricting competition are prohibited. However, to pro-
vide "gateways" in cases where production, marketing or other agreements are beneficial
in terms of greater efficiency, better resource allocation, and economies of scale, sections
27-31 contain provisions whereby such agreements can be registered with the Tribunal
and gain exemption from the general prohibition of section 16.
Three types of registered agreements can be approved by the Tribunal according to
the following criteria:
(a) Specialization Agreements—Pooling of production facilities is permitted
under these agreements, so that a number of companies may agree to allocate
production of various items among themselves for the purpose of achieving
economies of scale from longer production runs or from some other concentra-
tion of effort in the area of manufacture or distribution. Bill C-256, 28th Parl.,
3d Sess. § 27(6) (1971). In such cases the Tribunal must be satisfied that the
resulting economies will lower retail costa significantly. Competition, as a result
of the agreement, may be reduced significantly, and thus the Tribunal must be
satisfied that a substantial part of the savings will be passed on to the public in
the form of lower prices or better products. Furthermore, specialization agree-
ments could also be approved where they are necessary to meet competition from
imports, with the same requirement that savings be passed on to the public.
(b) Export Agreements—The Tribunal will accept and register export agree-
ments if competition in Canada will not be adversely affected as a result of the
agreement. Bill C-256, 28th Pad., 3d Sess. § 27(7) (1971). Again, even if the
agreement has an adverse effect upon competition, it will still be approved if the
Tribunal is satisfied that it will result in substantial gains for the participants,
part of which will be passed on to the Canadian public in the form of lower
prices or better products.
(c) Franchise Agreements—In accordance with the proposed Act, "franchise
agreement" is defined as an arrangement whereby business is carried on by a
group of independent businesses using a common trade name or symbol to
achieve economies in operation or management. As soon as these agreements are
filed with the Tribunal, they become exempt from Section 16 of the Act, unless
they are challenged by the Commissioner. If the Commissioner seeks to show
cause why a franchise registration should be cancelled the Tribunal must order
a hearing. The Tribunal, following the hearing, may cancel the registration if it
finds that the arrangement significantly restricts competition. Bill C-256, 28th
Pad., 3d Sess. § 30-31 (1971).
77 Explanatory Notes, supra note 42, at 36. To facilitate the speedy conclusion of
issues before the Commissioner, if parties and the Tribunal are agreed, provision is made
for the issuing of consent orders by the Tribunal. Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 62
(1971).
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CUrrent legislation provides that after the Director gathers all
the pertinent information he may submit a statement to the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission if he believes that an offense contrary
to a provision in Part V of the Act has been committed. The Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission is not in any way comparable to the
United States Federal Trade Commission. The Canadian Commission's
function is merely to hear arguments and receive evidence relating to
a particular alleged offense. After all such persons have had an op-
portunity to be heard, a report is drawn up. The Commission does not
adjudicate issues, determine rights and liabilities or issue cease and
desist orders, nor dOes it have the power to regulate industry. Its func-
tions are limited to reviewing the evidence placed before it, appraising
the effect of the proposed activity on the market and making recom-
mendations as to the application of remedies under the Act. Of course,
the public interest is a major consideration in arriving at such recom-
mendations. Reports of the Commission . are submitted to the Minister
responsible under the Act and must be made public within thirty days
after receipt by the Minister unless the Commission recommends against
publication of the report.
Under the proposed Competition Act, the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Commission would disappear and be replaced by the Competitive
Practices Tribunal. This would be the principal vehicle for administer-
ing provisions of the new Act relating to mergers, specialization and
export agreements and trade practices. In addition, the Tribunal would
provide a forum for the resolution of specific and general disputes
relating to competition policy as defined in the Act. The responsibilities
of the Tribunal would include seven main functions: 1) approval and
review of application for registered export and specialization agree-
ments, and receipt of registrations relating to franchise agreements;"
2) maintenance of a register of foreign and domestic mergers, and pro-
hibition of such mergers or interlocking directorates as are found to be
improper under criteria laid down in the Act relating to possible
adverse effects on competition; " 3) receipt of evidence relating to
contravention of those sections of the Act concerning price discrimina-
tion, promotional allowances, tied sales, directed selling, exclusive deal-
ing or reciprocal buying, and issuance of orders prohibiting such trade
practices when found in individual cases to be harmful to competition; 8°
4) conduct of hearing on its own initiative or upon request of the
Minister to examine any matter within its jurisdiction and the sub-
sequent publication of guidelines presenting the Tribunal's views on
78 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. H 27-31 (1971).
79
 Bill C-256, 28th Part, 3d Sess. I 36 (1971).
80 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. H 37-42 (1971).
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the matter examined for the information of the parties concerned;"
5) drafting of advance rulings on the request of private parties or the
Commissioner as to the Tribunal's position concerning a merger or
proposed merger, or any other matter within its jurisdiction, such
advance rulings to be binding on the Tribunal but not on the parties
requesting the ruling; 82 6) conduct of general inquiries into any matter
relevant to the objectives and policies of the Act, when they are
requested by the Minister;" and 7) examination of foreign laws, de-
crees or government directives to ensure that they will not operate in
Canada contrary to Canadian competition policy."
Although designated as a court of record," the Tribunal would have
no power to levy punishment. At the conclusion of any hearing, it can
apply or recommend the following remedies: a) issue a prohibition order
to prevent continuance of restrictive trade practice;" b) order one or
more Canadian suppliers to deal with a businessman who was unable
to obtain supplies due to a refusal to deal resulting from the non-com-
petitive or monopolistic character of a market; B 7 c) recommend to the
cabinet that customs duties be removed, reduced or remitted to remedy
a refusal to deal; 88 d) issue interim injunctions;" e) issue supple-
mentary orders requiring individuals found in contravention of the
provisions relating to restrictive practices to take certain actions to
remedy the situations caused by the contravention; 90 f) forbid the
implementation of foreign decrees or directives in Canada that would
be harmful to competition or to Canadian trade and commerce;" and
g) modify rights relating to the use of patents, trademarks, copyrights
and registered industrial designs if these contravene the Act.'
The significant change wrought by the proposed legislation is that
the Tribunal would be empowered to apply actual remedies and is not
restricted to recommendations alone. Under present legislation the
Commission can only recommend injunction, while under the pro-
posed legislation, the Tribunal would have authority to issue interim
injunctions. Additional affirmative powers given to the Tribunal indicate
that it will be more than an advisory body.
Civil proceedings, whether brought by the Crown or by private
81
 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 44 (1971).
82 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 45 (1971).
83
 Bill C-256, 28th Parl, 3d Sess. § 46 (1971).
84 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. §§ 49-50 (1971).
85 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3c1 Sess. §§ 3-15 (1971).
86 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 37 (1971).
87
 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 43 (1971).
88 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 43 (1971).
86 Bill C-256, 28th Part, 3d Sess. § 47 (1971).
90 Bill C-256, 28th Part, 3d Sess. § 48 (1971),
81 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. §§ 49-50 (1971).
92 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. § 51 (1971),
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citizens are unavailable under current legislation. The only available
remedy is through the Criminal Code. Following a report of the
Restrictive 'Trade Practices Commission or a direct referral by the
Director, the Attorney General may institute legal proceedings in
the criminal courts if he deems such action necessary.
' The Competition Act would change existing law in three ways.
In certain instances it would allow the courts to order an offender to
pay double damages to the person injured as a result of the offense.'
'Other sections of the proposed legislation permit the attorneys general
of the various provinces as well as the Attorney General' of Canada
and the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs to institute pro-
ceedings. In addition, six citizens, through an application to the Com-
missioner can cause the Minister to lay charges. Finally, penalties up
to a maximum of one million dollars or two years in prison or both may
be imposed for an indictable offense. The maximum penalty is increased
to a fine of two million dollars or five years imprisonment or both.
Despite these three changes, conduct which is prohibited per se
remains within the jurisdiction of the criminal courts. Similarly, pro-
cedures and rules of evidence remain the same as under the Combines
Investigation Act. It is submitted that the Competition Act does not
go far enough in changing the role of the courts. Providing for civil
actions to be instituted directly by injured individuals would have
circumvented the time consuming procedure of applying to the Com-
missioner and would have brought more pressure, through the fear of
private litigation, to bear upon manufacturers who engage in deceptive
and unfair trade practices.
CONCLUSION
The primary objective of the Combines Investigation Act has been
the encouragement of economic efficiency. However, the myriad factors,
in addition to competition policy, which affect the efficiency of a na-
tion's economy make the success of this legislation in achieving its
objective difficult to measure. On the other hand, the existing Act has
served as a strong deterrent in three primary areas of prohibited busi-
ness conduct—collusive price fixing, resale price maintenance, and
misleading advertising. Nonetheless, in respect to mergers, which can
have an important impact on economic efficiency, the present corn-
03 Bill C-256, 28th Parl., 3d Sess. # 80(1) (1971) provides:
Subject to subsection (2), a court that convicts an accused of an offence under
section 73 or subsection 74(2) may, on application of any person who suffered
loss or damage as a result of the act or neglect that gave rise to the conviction,
at the time sentence is imposed, order the accused to pay to that person an
amount equal to double the amount of the loss or damage proved to have been
suffered by him.
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bines legislation has been all but inoperative. In view of these short-
comings, it has been recommended and proposed that competition
policy in Canada be framed in terms that provide as much precision
and certainty as possible while ensuring enough flexibility to permit
the economic judgments of the marketplace to be brought to bear
on the day-to-day decisions of businessmen. Unfortunately, however,
it would seem that the proposed Act attempts to introduce a set
of business ethics which is in direct contradiction with the concepts of
a normally ethical businessman. Furthermore, the framing of the pro-
posed legislation in concise but general language is of little use to a
businessman who seeks to know whether a particular situation would be
classified as having a "significant" restraint on competition. It would
seem that even though the concept of "undueness" has been removed
from the Act, the alternative phraseology in using the term "significant"
does not create more precision and certainty in the legislative language.
Furthermore, the formation of a Tribunal of seven individuals who
would then be in a position to shape national policy in areas of great
economic importance appears to be an excessive grant of power. In
accordance with the proposed legislation, this quasi-judicial body will
be able to determine whether, and to what extent, Canadian companies
may grow larger by merger, may attain more efficient production or
distribution by a cooperative effort, or engage in certain trade practices
of questionable benefit to the public interest. As a result, it would
appear that by establishing a Tribunal with such powers, many of the
day-to-day business practices in Canada would be regulated by a
detailed code of business ethics based on a highly theoretical view of
competition policy. No doubt, there is a need for a tribunal which is
better qualified to judge economic realities than the criminal courts.
However, this need must be balanced against the questionable wisdom
of creating a quasi-judicial body whose powers might greatly curtail
business initiative.
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